 |
 |
|
 |
 |
 |

 |
 |
|
|
Case Study for Agency 03-1014981-841
MINI, a division of BMW
When we first started working with the MINI brand in early 2001
American roads were dominated by SUV’s – the fastest growing segment –
and light trucks was the most popular segment in the category. Japanese
and German brands dominated the import segment and gas was 1.25.
Bigger was better. Small car sales were at their lowest point in 15
years.
It was into this environment that we were asked to launch the MINI
brand, and two new models the Cooper and Cooper S - the smallest cars
on the American road. And, MINI’s heritage was British, which was
synonymous with unreliability in the car category. And to top it off,
we were asked to do it with a budget that gave us less than 1% share of
voice in a cluttered category – about 15% of what VW had to launch the
New Beetle.
Consumer Learning:
As part of our planning efforts, we talked with classic Mini owners and
put hidden cameras in a new MINI and left it out in public. We learned
that the MINI is a blast to drive. A raw, exhilarating driving
experience. More like riding a go-kart than driving a car. We also
learned about the amazing “curb appeal” of the MINI and that this made
owning a MINI as exhilarating as it was to drive. We wondered if other
cars were as exhilarating?
To answer this question, we examined dozens of cars in terms of their
0-60 acceleration and skid pad rating (a measure of a car’s ability to
hold a corner at high speed). We also created a “WOW” factor by showing
consumers pictures of dozens of cars and asking them to rate each car
in terms of its curb appeal and head turning ability. These measures
were combined to form an Index of Exhilaration, where:
Exhilaration = (0-60 acceleration) + (skid pad rating) + (“WOW”
factor).
Planning showed that what set MINI apart in the category was its high
exhilaration relative to its low price-point. The implication? This was
MINI’s USP.
Initially, MINI identified their primary target as a younger, upscale
male who lived in an urban market. But planning showed that MINI’s best
prospect was not defined by age or gender or income bracket. It was
defined by a similar way of thinking, a similar approach to life and
similar values. These were people who loved to drive and wanted to be
their own person and choose their own path. For them individual self-
expression was key. And these similarities crossed generations and
gender and socio-economic status. The implication? The most effective
way to market the new MINI was not to a demographic, but to a mindset.
Category Learning:
When we examined the automotive category, we saw a category defined by
certain conventions. Television was the dominant medium, followed by
print. Everyone talked about “driving” and the car’s technical
specifications. You never showed a car dirty. The list goes on.
The Strategy:
We realized that no matter what we said about the new MINI or who we
talked to, with less than 1% share of voice we could never break
through following category conventions or using traditional media. We
had to break conventions to stand out. Advertising wasn’t the answer –
innovation was. The strategy was to use non-traditional media whenever
possible and traditional media in very non-traditional ways. We were
not looking for below the line solutions, we were looking for below the
bedrock solutions.
The Execution:
So, we have the new MINI, a car uniquely exhilarating to own and drive.
And, we have a person - a mindset - who is fully engaged in life and
individual self-expression. We knew something very remarkable would
happen when the new MINI and our best prospects came together. We knew
this was our opportunity to create an alternative culture of driving
and do all the things that the current culture couldn’t or wouldn’t do.
We first called this new culture “going”. But “going” in your MINI
sounded a lot like peeing in your MINI so we kept on thinking. Then the
creatives came up with the perfect name – motoring. Motoring is
different than driving, it’s more exhilarating. It’s less about getting
from A to B and more about getting from A to Z – about taking a unique
route. It’s a closer relationship between driver, car and road.
Motoring was the big idea that was at the heart of launching the new
MINI in the U.S.. We knew motoring was something MINI could own because
every other automobile manufacturer talks about driving. And we knew
motoring gave us license and reason to break all the conventions we
wanted.
The Results:
We’ve built awareness and consideration for MINI.
Total brand awareness is 80% after our first year of marketing.
The MINI Cooper converts about 40% of awareness into consideration -
which puts it in pretty good company among its competitive set. Only
the Toyota Celica, Honda Civic and VW Jetta convert significantly more.
We’ve driven traffic to the website and to dealerships and sold a ton
of cars.
We’ve averaged 67,000 unique visitors to the website each week (675,000
total site visits per month) and have over 150,000 registrants – people
who have given us their personal information and asked for interaction
with the brand.
MINI sold 25,000 cars in the U.S. last year – 5,000 more than
projected, and MINI has surpassed its sales projections every month
since the launch. One year after launch we’ve had our best two months
(May and June ‘03) ever.
But, probably the best measure of our success is the ROI of our
nontraditional marketing efforts.
MINI spent roughly 567,000 for each percentage point of awareness. The
other 12 brands in MINI’s competitive set spent an average of
5,973,000 (or more than 10 times as much) to do the same.
Molson Canadian
Molson is Canada’s number one selling domestic beer. It was a pretty
popular import in the U.S. in the 70’s, 80’s and early 90’s. Miller,
which owned the rights to the Molson brand during the late 90’s put its
marketing emphasis elsewhere. The best-known Molson brand, Molson
Canadian was neglected.
As a result, while imported beers have enjoyed a period of strong
growth (8-12% on average) in the U.S. over the last several years,
Molson has seen its sales volume decline roughly by half. In an effort
to rescue and rebuild the brand, Molson bought back its rights from
Miller in 2001 and hired CP+B in 2002 to regain momentum for Molson
U.S.A. and relaunch Molson Canadian as its flagship brand in the U.S.
Consumer Learning:
Creating momentum in the beer category happens on-premise (the beer
industry term for bars and restaurants). Guys go to bars and
restaurants to meet women. In the absence of women they will eat hot
wings, watch sports, play pool and talk about women. But meeting and
connecting with women is what it’s all about. No real insight there.
So, we went on-premise to observe and learn what happens. We went to
clubs, restaurants, upscale bars, sports bars and a few dives. Any
place you could get a cold bottle of imported beer. We watched how guys
held their bottle of beer – with the label facing forward. How they
positioned it at a table – in front of them. We learned the difference
between “Wednesday night beers” with the guys and “Friday night beers”
with the ladies. What we learned was that Molson’s category isn’t
really beer, but rather male fashion. It turns out that our target
(males 21-27) uses beer exactly the same way they use fashion labels -
to “signal” who they are and what they’re all about and make themselves
more attractive to the opposite sex. And certain beer brands have spent
millions of dollars over many years to give their labels badge value.
Corona says you’re laid back. Heineken says you’re up and coming and
know quality. Guinness says you’re a bit of a beer connoisseur. The
implication? We needed Molson Canadian to become a badge too.
Planning wanted to find out what, if any badge value Molson Canadian
did or could have. We were shocked to find out that Molson Canadian
didn’t really say anything. Most brands say something, even if it’s
negative. But Molson didn’t. Planning showed that beyond being from
Canada, Molson didn’t have any meaning or any real badge value (and
therefore relevance) to our guys and didn’t make them any more or less
attractive to women.
From a momentum standpoint, the “sweet spot” in the beer category is
twenty-something males who are socially active. Planning showed that
while these guys were young and socially active, they were not
necessarily socially confident or self-assured. Through their choice of
brands and choice of words they risk sending the wrong message about
themselves to others – especially to members of the opposite sex. And
they seek out tools to help lower that risk.
So, they turn to Maxim and Stuff and FHM to lower their risk and gain
confidence in these types of social situations and to add to their
arsenal of tools that help them become good conversationalists and
connect with women. These include small talk, social banter, comebacks,
self-deprecating humor, jokes, etc. Mastering these skills can mean the
difference between getting a girls phone number at the end of the night
or getting totally shot down.
The implication? While beer is a natural social lubricant, no beer
brand explicitly gives guys on-premise tools to succeed and feel
self-assured in these types of social situations. This was Molson’s
opportunity.
The Strategy:
Position Molson as the import beer brand that helps our young, single
males to be successful and self-assured with women.
Make Molson Canadian a tool that helps them start and maintain a
conversation with women. Make Molson Canadian a “signaling” device that
shows who they are and what they’re all about.
The Execution:
We knew that the label on the front of the Molson Canadian bottle had
very little meaning for our guys. And that it could take years and
millions of dollars to give Molson Canadian meaning the conventional
way. Time and money the Molson brand didn’t have. The implication? We
needed to cheat both time and money and give Molson Canadian immediate
badge value and relevance in order to survive.
So the creative team asked Molson to put a second or “Twin” label on
the back of the bottle that we could use as media to give Molson
Canadian immediate relevance. And we knew what was most relevant to our
guys – tools to help them gain confidence and be successful with women.
The idea was that with Molson’s Twin Label Technology you could let
your Molson do the talking.
But adding a second label was not an inexpensive proposition. In fact,
it would require a million dollar capital investment by Molson to
retool their lines at the factory. So, they put a lot of pressure on
planning to prove to them that Twin Label technology would work and
show them how.
First thing we did was mock up a couple of bottles of Molson Canadian
with Twin Label Technology and conduct a series of friendship-cell
interviews with our target guys. These interviews showed that guys
really liked the Twin Label idea because they saw how it could help
them when they were out socializing. But, they also wanted assurance
that there would be a lot of different Twin Labels. Otherwise, they
said, the idea would grow stale – fast.
So next, we mocked up blank labels and took them out to bars and
restaurants. We asked our target and their female friends to brainstorm
and come up with their own ideas for what our Twin Labels should say.
We collected hundreds of Twin Label ideas as part of this effort.
While most of them were a bit over the top and couldn’t be used, they
did help tell us and the creative team what category’s guys needed the
most help with. Areas like pick-up lines and ice breakers, rejection
deflection, comebacks, statements of strength and physical prowess,
etc.
Finally, when we had enough Twin Labels developed, we mocked up a
couple of cases of Molson Canadian and had a Molson night at a local
bar to see what happened. The Molson client went with us. What happened
was remarkable. After a few beers, guys were removing the labels from
the bottle and sticking them on their shirt or pants. They were buying
more beer to see what labels they got and trading them among friends.
And women were having as much fun with Twin Label Technology as the
guys. Clearly we were on to something. After observing what happened
that night the Molson client made the decision to invest in Twin Label
Technology. They retooled their line and our creatives went to work.
So far we’ve developed 232 “Twin” labels and planning was instrumental
in uncovering the insights that led to the Twin Label idea and in the
development of the actual labels.
The Results:
Positive opinion of the Molson Canadian brand is up 30% since we
launched the Twin Label idea, and we’ve made progress in reshaping the
image of Molson Canadian on key user imagery attributes. Guys who have
never tried Molson but would consider it is up 26% since the launch of
Twin Labels (from 53% to 67%).
Molson Twin Labels was just named “Top Gear” in the July 2003 issue of
Maxim.
Since breaking the Twin Label idea, Molson Canadian sales are up 48%
and revenue is up 40%. Molson Canadian is now the fastest growing major
imported beer in the U.S. Molson Canadian has gown 48% when imports (as
a category) have slowed from 8-12% annual growth to about 2% last year.
The Molson Canadian brand now accounts for 43% of Molson’s total U.S.
volume.
What this means is that Molson sold 84,000 more barrels of Molson
Canadian than they did a year ago. With an industry average of 30-40
profit on a barrel of beer, this translates into nearly 3,000,000. So,
Molson has already paid for retooling its line in the U.S. and made
about 200% profit above and beyond their initial million-dollar
investment.
The idea has been so successful that Molson retooled their lines in
Canada and Twin Label Technology is now available north of the border.
So don’t be surprised if you see a guy next to you at the bar holding a
Molson Canadian with a label that proclaims, “One-man Bachelorette
Party”.
![[Home]](/images/navwhite-home.gif)
|
|
|